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A Relational Approach to Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: Molien v. Kaiser Foundation 
Hospitals 
In nearly all jurisdictions, a plaintiff seeking recovery for 
the negligent infliction of emotional distress must have suffered 
some physical injury either contemporaneous with or subsequent 
to the emotional harm in order to state a cause of action.' One 
effect of this requirement has been to restrict recovery for emo- 
tional distress primarily to claims in which the plaintiff has suf- 
fered fright or shock in a single, traumatic incident- 
circumstances in which physical injury is likely to occur. Recov- 
ery for distress suffered as a result of emotional states such as 
humiliation, jealousy, or embarrassment has been effectively 
barred because these emotions are generally experienced in cir- 
cumstances that do not produce any physical injury.' Because 
the physical injury requirement has consistently weeded out 
cases involving the latter emotions, the distinction between 
fright or shock and these other emotions has never been recog- 
nized by the courts. In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation  hospital^,^ 
the California Supreme Court expressly abolished the physical 
injury requirement in all emotional distress cases and, more im- 
portantly, implicitly recognized a cause of action for emotional 
distress not caused by fright or shock and not suffered in a sin- 
gle, traumatic incident. 
1. According to Prosser, "Where the defendant's negligence causes only mental dis- 
turbance, without accompanying physical injury or physical consequences, or any other 
independent basis for tort liability, there is still general agreement that in the ordinary 
case there can be no recovery." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 328-29 
(4th ed. 1971). Hawaii and New York have departed from the rule requiring contempora- 
neous or consequential physical harm. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156,472 P.2d 
509 (1970); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). 
2. One commentator has observed: 
[alpplication of the 'physical injury' test in such a case [humiliation] has an 
Alice-in-Wonderland quality about it, because physical injury is not normally 
the likely result of the type of wrong committed. It is not as likely as it is, for 
example, in cases where a plaintiff is put in fear of violence, or attempts an 
escape from danger. 
Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L. REV. 232, 
254 (1961). 
3. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). 
CASE NOTES 
The plaintiff, Stephen H. Molien, and his wife, Valerie, were 
members of a health plan serviced by the defendant hospital. 
The plan covered expenses Mrs. Molien incurred during a rou-. 
tine physical examination administered by Dr. Thomas Kil- 
bridge, a Kaiser staff physician. Dr. Kilbridge erroneously con- 
cluded that Mrs. Molien had contracted syphilis. Although she 
did not actually have the disease, she received penicillin treat- 
ments and was instructed to tell her husband that she had the 
disease. Consequently, Mr. Molien underwent blood tests to de- 
termine whether he had transmitted the purported disease to his 
wife. Before it was discovered that Dr. Kilbridge's diagnosis was 
erroneous, Mrs. Molien began to suspect her husband's marital 
fidelity, which led to the eventual breakup of the Moliens' mar- 
riage. Mr. Molien brought an action against Kaiser Foundation 
Hospitals and Dr. Kilbridge, seeking recovery for the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and for loss of con~ortium.~ 
The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer to both 
causes of action. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that 
Molien's "complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
[was] deficient in two respects: (1) there was no corresponding 
physical injury and (2) the test of foreseeability [was] not met."6 
On appeal the California Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.' Applying the foreseeability 
test,' the court concluded that "[ilt is easily predictable that an 
erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its probable source would 
produce marital discord and resultant emotional distress to a 
4. Although Molien is significant because of its holding that a spouse may recover 
for loss of consortium when the other spouse suffers emotional harm but no physical 
injury, this Note will focus exclusively on the emotional distress issue. The interest pro- 
tected by the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress must be distinguished from 
the interests protected by the torts of loss of consortium and alienation of affections. 
The latter causes of action, which are typically relied upon in fact patterns similar to 
Molien, provide remedies for interference with the marriage relationship; whereas the 
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress provides a remedy for interference with 
one's interest in being free from mental disturbance. Molien is therefore a hybrid in that 
Mr. Molien's mental tranquility was disturbed as a result of interference with his 
marriage. 
5. 96 Cal. App. 3d 469, 474, 158 Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1979). 
6. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980). 
7. The court rejected defendant's argument that the case should be decided accord- 
ing to the foreseeability test established in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
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married patient's ~pouse."~ Because the risk of harm was reason- 
ably foreseeable, the doctor owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise 
due care in making the diagnosis. 
The court then abolished the physical injury requirement in 
all emotional distress cases. It criticized the requirement as 
overinclusive in allowing recovery for emotional distress when 
accompanied by trivial physical injuries and as underinclusive in 
mechanically barring potentially valid claims. In addition, the 
court noted that the physical injury requirement "encourages 
extravagant pleading and distorted testimony."@ As a substitute 
for the physical injury requirement, the court adopted a stan- 
dard articulated by the Supreme Court of Hawaii: " '[Tlhe gen- 
eral standard of proof required to support a claim of mental dis- 
tress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of 
the case.' "lo The jury must determine whether a particular case 
meets this standard; if it concludes that the defendant's conduct 
would cause emotional distress to a reasonable person in the 
plaintiffs position, the genuineness standard is satisfied. Fur- 
thermore, the majority noted, there may be cases in which ex- 
pert medical testimony can objectively ascertain the existence of 
emotional injury." 
Justice Clark's lone dissent voiced the concern that the 
court was creating a new cause of action which, because of the 
court's failure to establish any limitations on a defendant's lia- 
bility, would have severe consequences. By abandoning the 
physical injury requirement, which had previously guarded 
against spurious claims, the court was opening the door to fraud- 
ulent suits. Justice Clark also noted that by holding a person 
liable for unintentionally caused emotional distress, the court 
was imposing liability far in excess of moral culpability. 
Although Molien will frequently be cited for its rejection of 
the physical injury requirement, the court's decision to grant re- 
covery in a case involving neither fright nor shock is a more sig- 
8. 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
9. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
10. Id. at 930,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 
Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)). The dissent in Molien criticized these "stan- 
dards" as "nonstandards, opening wide the door to abuse." 27 Cal. 3d at 935,616 P.2d at 
824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
11. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. 
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nificant development.12 Most cases recognizing a cause of action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress involve a plaintiff 
who has suffered automatic, reflexive emotional states such as 
fright or shock in response to some external stimulus.1s In 
addition, 
[i]t is generally conceded by legal scholars that even under 
the most liberal theory of bystander recovery, the psychic im- 
pact upon the injured party must be "traumatic." That is, the 
principal cause of the psychological disability must be a single, 
sudden, or unexpected event; a shock to the bystander's mental 
and psychological equilibrium; or a trauma or "blow" to his 
nervous system.14 
Molien is novel in the field of emotional distress both as to 
the type of emotion involved and as to the event eliciting the 
emotion. Mr. Molien experienced neither fright nor shock, and 
his response to the doctor's negligent diagnosis was neither re- 
flexive nor automatic. Rather, he experienced a composite of 
jealousy, anxiety, doubt, suspicion, humiliation, embarrassment, 
and various other emotions incident to rejected love in the mar- 
riage relationship.16 In addition, the event which directly pre- 
ceded Mr. Molien's harm was not a spontaneous, isolated inci- 
dent of immediate, shocking impact as in the typical case; 
instead the event eliciting the distress (the deterioration of the 
marriage) was an ongoing process of relatively long duration." 
12. The courts have not recognized a distinction between fright or shock and other 
forms of mental anguish. Because physical injury is not likely to occur in cases involving 
these other emotions, the physicial injury requirement has automatically barred recovery 
in all such cases. Brody, supra note 2, at 233-38. 
13. See id. at 254-55. 
14. Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Be- 
tween California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 16 (1976). Although the com- 
mentator refers specifically to bystander cases, the articulated rule is applicable to all 
emotional distress cases, as is evidenced by the commentator's summary of the principle: 
"In sum, the necessity of a 'traumatic' shock as the cause of psychic harm and resulting 
physical injuries is generally accepted in the law of torts . . . ." Id. at  17. 
15. One commentator has noted the distinction between cases involving fright or 
shock and those involving indignities such as humiliation or embarrassment: 
Where indignity or humiliation is the harm, it is the plaintiffs consciousness of 
the insult or the wrong and his sensitivity to it which gives rise to a delibera- 
tive reaction to the wrong. It is not so automatic a reaction, for example, as 
fright, or nausea from obnoxious matter in food, or an attempt to escape from 
peril, nor is it as readily foreseeable as these more automatic reactions. 
Brody, supra note 2, at 254-55. 
16. The distinction between immediate and ongoing harm was recogized by the 
Eighth Circuit in Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973). In 
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Although Dr. Kilbridge's negligent diagnosis triggered a chain of 
events which eventually resulted in Mr. Molien's emotional 
harm, the isolated event of learning of the diagnosis did not 
cause immediate injury. After Dr. Kilbridge told Mrs. Molien 
that she had syphilis, she became suspicious of her husband's 
fidelity, which caused extreme tension and anxiety in their rela- 
tionship and the eventual breakup of the marriage. Mr. Molien 
sought recovery for the emotional distress suffered as a conse- 
quence of the marital strain experienced over this entire period 
of time-not for distress suffered incident to an isolated event as 
in the typical emotional distress cases.'' 
Although much of the court's language suggests a broad 
sweep, the facts of Molien imply at least two restrictions on its 
holding. First, recovery should be limited to situations in which 
the emotional distress results from the breakup of a marriage or 
some similar significant relationship such as the parent-child re- 
lationship. Other, less binding relationships which might con- 
ceivably satisfy this requirement would have to be determined 
on a case by case basis. Second, only those persons standing in a 
special position of trust with respect to the relationship should 
be held liable for emotional harm caused by a negligent impair- 
ment of the relationship. Persons in addition to doctors who 
might satisfy this requirement are lawyers, accountants, psychol- 
ogists, and clergymen. 
The Molien court established the plaintiffs right to be free 
Owens the parenta of a decedent brought suit for negligent infliction of emotional dis- 
tress caused by defendants' negligence in diagnosing and treating their son. Plaintiffs 
sought recovery for the mental anguish they allegedly suffered during the month-long 
deterioration of his health. The court declined to extend liability to cases in which "the 
incident was slowly unfolding rather than traumatic." Id. at 467. 
17. For an example of how the courts have typically dealt with emotional distress 
cases in which the harm does not arise out off fright or shock and is gradual rather than 
traumatic, see Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,366 N.E.2d 64,397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). 
In Lecher, the parents of an infant girl born with Tay-Sachs disease sued their doctor for 
the emotional distress and mental anguish suffered in watching their daughter suffer 
severe pain and eventually die as a result of the disease. The parents alleged that the 
defendant was negligent in failing to inform them that as Eastern European Jews there 
existed a high risk that their child would be born with Tay-Sachs disease. Had they been 
informed, contended the parents, they could have avoided the trauma by aborting the 
pregnancy. The New York Court of Appeals held for the doctor, concluding that a plain- 
tiff may not recover for mental distress suffered as a result of physical injuries sustained 
by a third party. Although the court did not explicitly recognize the difference between 
gradual and traumatic harm, Lecher is like Molien in that the parents' emotional harm 
did not stem from fright or shock, but from some form of anguish unique to the parent- 
child relationship. In addition, the harm did not result from an isolated incident, but 
rather from a long deterioration of their daughter's condition. 
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from the mental anguish of a broken marriage caused by an- 
other's negligent conduct. The emotional interests protected in 
Molien are special to the marriage relationship. Marriage is pre- 
mised on the mutual investment of a high degree of love, trust, 
confidence, and faith in the relationship. Because of this inti- 
macy and emotional involvement, each spouse is extremely vul- 
nerable to emotional injury if the marriage is impaired. Damage 
to the relationship will almost certainly be translated into dam- 
age to each spouse's emotional interest in the marriage. Thus, 
dissolution of the marriage is itself an important guarantee that 
emotional distress has in fact been suffered. This obviates the 
need for a mechanical bar to prevent spurious claims such as the 
physical injury requirement? Courts interpreting Molien should 
recognize the significance of the marriage relationship in the 
case and limit future applications of the holding to cases in 
which similar relational interests are involved. 
The second limitation on Molien steme from the position of 
trust occupied by Dr. Kilbridge. In Molien the issue was 
whether Dr. Kilbridge owed a duty of refraining from conduct 
that would impair Mr. Molien's emotional investment in his 
marriage. The court implicitly concluded that because of the 
trust inherent in a doctor-patient relationship, a doctor owes 
such a duty to a patient's spouse.19 Because of the intimacy of 
the marriage relationship, any time a doctor treats one spouse he 
is in a sense treating the relationship itself, particularly where 
the treatment implicates the spouse's fidelity? If, on the other 
hand, a lay person had told Mrs. Molien that she had contracted 
syphilis, there would have been little if any damage to the mar- 
riage. In the former case the position of trust held by the doctor 
with respect to the spouse causes a duty of due care to arise with 
18. Although the court abolished the physical injury requirement, it did acknowl- 
edge a need for some means of preventing spurious claims and intended the "genuine- 
ness in the circumstances of the case" test to fill that need. "Although we recognize a 
need to guard against fraudulent claims, we are not persuaded that the presently existing 
artificial lines of demarcation are the only appropriate means of attaining this goal." 27 
Cal. 3d at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837. 
19. It is easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its proba- 
ble source would produce marital discord and resultant emotional distress to a 
married patient's spouse; Dr. Kilbridge's advice to Mrs. Molien to have her 
husband examined for the disease confirms that plaintiff was a foreseeable vic- 
tim of the negligent diagnosis. 
Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
20. Similarly, the court stated, "We thus agree with plaintiff that the alleged tor- 
tious conduct of defendant was directed to him as well as to his wife." Id. 
214 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
respect to the relationship and hence to both parties to the rela- 
tionship. In the latter case, no such trust exists with respect to 
the spouse and therefore no duty arises with respect to the 
relationship. 
A failure to recognize these limitations would mean that a 
Molien-type plaintiff who has not suffered fright or shock and 
who has not suffered harm in an isolated, traumatic incident 
would encounter fewer obstacles in stating a cause of action than 
would a plaintiff in a bystander case who has suffered emotional 
harm resulting from the serious injury or death of a close rela- 
tive in an automobile accident. The Molien rule applies when 
the harm to the plaintiff is "direct."" In bystander cases, how- 
ever, the injury is classified as "indirect" and the Dillon v. 
Legg2l rule is applicable. In Dillon, the California Supreme 
Court imposed a rigid standard of foreseeability in bystander 
cases, establishing three critieria that must be satisfied for the 
plaintiff to state a cause of action: (1) The plaintiff must have 
been near the scene of the accident; (2) The shock must have 
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from 
the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident; 
(3) The plaintiff and the victim must have been closely related? 
In Molien, however, the court merely requires the jury to find 
that the injury is genuine. Not only is the distinction between 
"direct" and "indirect" injury murky,'4 but the result produced 
by the application of differing standards of foreseeability is 
anomalous because the fright or shock suffered in a bystander 
case is more readily verifiable than are emotional states such as 
humiliation, embarrassment, or jealousy. For example, in Deboe 
u. Horn,26 the plaintiff was called to a hospital, where she was 
informed that her husband had been involved in a serious auto- 
mobile accident which had caused total paralysis. The plaintiff 
sued the driver of the other automobile, seeking recovery for the 
mental suffering and emotional trauma she experienced upon 
learning of her husband's injuries. A California court of appeal 
sustained the defendant's demurrer, stating that no cause of ac- 
21. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. 
22. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
23. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
24. It is difficult to understand how the harm suffered by the spouse of a doctor's 
patient as a result of the doctor's negligent diagnosis is any more direct than the harm 
suffered by the mother of a child hit by a negligent driver. In each instance, the conduct 
triggering the plaintifPs harm was directed toward a close relative of the plaintiff. 
25. 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971). 
2081 CASE NOTES 215 
tion existed because the plaintiff was not present at the scene of 
the accident as required by Dillon. Under a broad reading of 
Molien, however, a plaintiff who claims he suffered mental dis- 
tress upon learning from an acquaintance that his girlfriend had 
been "cheating" on him could allege a "direct" injury and thus 
get his case to the jury without first hurdling any similar legal 
barriers. And yet, the type of harm suffered in the latter scena- 
rio would seem to be more susceptible of sham than the type of 
harm suffered by the plaintiff in Deboe. Recognition of the lim- 
its implied by the relationships involved in Molien would avoid 
this anomaly. 
Molien recognizes a cause of action for the negligent inflic- 
tion of emotional distress although the harm does not arise out 
of fright or shock and the event eliciting the harm is a gradual 
process rather than a single, traumatic accident. However, courts 
deciding future mental distress cases should be aware of the pe- 
culiar nature of the emotional interests protected in Molien and 
recognize the special relationships involved. Future recovery 
should be restricted to those instances where a plaintiff has suf- 
fered emotional harm as a result of negligent interference with a 
significant relationship. Moreover, in determining who may be 
held liable, the courts should look for some relationship of trust 
between the alleged tortfeasor and the impaired relationship. 
Jordan W. Clements 
